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A proposal for the reorganiztion of the Pentagon is 
submitted ~vi th the full knowledge that similar findings by 
individuals far more experienced have been disregarded. My 
efforts were aimed at not only what is wrong with the 
present system, but what has worked in the past. 
Two major obstacles made my vmrk more complicated than 
anticipated. Due to the ongoing debate concerning the Joint 
Chiefs· of Staff, new information bacame available over the 
past few months, some of which had direct bearing on my 
studies. Also, as an insider looking out, I found it hard 
to accept many of the criticisms aimed at my profession. 
I am indebted to Professor Harold v. Sare for his help 
not only on my thesis but my entire graduate studies 
program. Had it not been for his guidance, patience, and 
understanding, I would not have succeeded. 
I also wish to thank my wonderful wife, Barbara, for 
her support during the often trying times of my abscence, 
and encouragement toward achieving my goals. 
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The military services' inability 
or unwillingness to work together 
has led this nation to military 
disaster or near-disaster. This 
has happened not once, or twice, 
but repeatedly since our services 
were first required to coordinate 
their efforts. .And the sad fact 
is that these problems persist. 
There will be those who· say the 
system "ain't broke, so don't fix 
it." However, it is broke, and we 
need to fix it. If we don't, our 
effective~ess will be seriously 
impaired. 
Senator Barry Goldwater 
2 October 1985 
In one statement, Senator Barry Goldwater, himself a 
retired Air Force Major General, sent a jolt through the 
entrenched bureaucracy of the Pentagon and ·signalled the 
begin·ning of one of the most widespread and controversial 
studies of the American military establishment to date. 
Goldv1ater is not alone in his efforts; numerous commissions 
and interest groups have launched their own individual 
investigations. And while there are many such studies, they 
all seem to focus on the same issue: the current way America 
prepares for and fights wars is outmoded. 
1 
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It is widely held that the last significant succssful 
military operation the United States' has conducted was the 
Inchon invasion in 1950. Since that time, even the most 
optimistic observer cannot overlook the plethora of failed 
operations we have suffered: the thirteen year debacle of 
Vietnam culminating in the clumsy Mayaguez raid of 1975 in 
which forty-one died to save forty; the Iran rescue raid of 
1980 where eight died and no one was rescued; the tragedy of 
Beirut which claimed the lives of 241 Marines; the invasion 
of Grenada in 1983 in which "the high heroism of the troops 
had to redeem gross failures of planning and command"; 2 and 
the Lebanon bombing raid of December 4, 1983, when the u.s. 
Navy lost two aircraft in a region where others bombed day 
after day with no losses at all. To a nation which believes 
that, in the words of Douglas MacArthur, "there is no 
substitute for victory", our military performance is less 
than spectacular. As Edward N. Luttwak, Senior Fellow at 
Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, indicates, "shaped by laws, 
regulations, and military priorities that date back to 1945-
1948, the very structures of the armed forces and of the 
Department of Defense are now badly outmoded; and we now 
know that the system is quite incapable of self-reform. 113 
The United States' failure in Vietnam is a complex dis-
cussion still not totally answered; the fault lies with 
many. Among them, the failure of the military structure and 
command system, not only leaders but institutions, is 
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especially dismal. ilri ting under the alias Cincinnatus, the 
author of Self Destruction comments, "the old refrain that 
the army failed because of political softness and social 
unrest at home is still the theme song of the upper ranks. 
T'ne fact is that the military disaster in Vietnam <:Jrew out 
of ineptitude at the top. 114 
Once troops were committed to Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff deemed it necessary to conform to the unified 
command system, that is, all services on equal footing. 
Notwithstanding, the war was primarily fought on the ground, 
the guerrilla nature alone would seem to dictate heavy 
emphasis on the Army. T'nis would not be the case. The 
result was that petty rivalries and competition among all 
branches of the armed forces caused confusion in policy, 
enormous staffs, and more emphasis placed on corporate har-
mony than on prosecution of the war. 
Each service took a "role enhancing" slice of the war, 
and the subsequent overlapping effort and chain of command 
created an extremely top heavy rank structure. By 1968, 
Saigon staff officers and their a.ides numbered 6,407 for the 
A.rmy 5 element alone. Even though· the number of troops in 
the field declined dramatically over the next three years, 
,-
the Saigon staff· grew to 13, 905. 0 The Air Force and Navy 
were also represented in similar fashion. By 1968, there 
were 110 generals and admirals stationed in Vietnam. 7 
Even with the high number of senior officers in Viet-
nam, the key decisions affecting almost every aspect of 
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the war were made in Washington. Targets for airstrikes 
were drawn up by the Secretary of Defense. A whole series 
of restrictions were placed on aircrews to avoid inflicting 
civilian casualties including putting many surface to air 
missile sights off limits, limiting the opportunities to 
engage enemy aircraft, even dictating the routes and alt-
itudes aircraft could fly to the targets. The result was 
that scores of American airmen lost their lives, and many 
more were captured. But the overcontrol continued with 
little interference throughout the war, and defied the very 
essence of military theory. 
The maze of bureaucratic offices and intrigues result-
ing from this top heavy command structure caused a veritable 
dearth of strategic thinking as individual interests 
competed for a "piece of the pie." On a given operation, 
such as retaking an enemy held village, the infantry would 
propose a normal seize and clear attack, the air cavalry 
would argue an airborne assault was in order, artillery 
officers maintained that a pulverizing barrage would make 
assault unnecessarz, if the target was close to the sea the 
Na~z wanted to use its surface combatants with their larger 
guns to do the job, the Air Force felt fi3hter bombers could 
be more accurate and deadly, and Strategic Air Command 
(SAC), an entity of its own, felt fighter bombers were but 
toys in comparison to the B-5 2s available. Special Forces 
would claim all of the other methods were improper and 
utterly clumsy, and proposed its own campaign of winning 
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the conf idenc:e of the populace through economic and medical 
aid while also killing the enemy. At the same time, the 
American advisers to South Vietnam stated repeatedly that 
all this could be done without risk to Americans if suf-
ficient aid and training was given to the Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces. 
Under ideal conditions, such a wide array of weapons 
and tactics would seem valuable to a commander in war, but 
with the unified system each element of the overall American 
force was given equitable consideration. The result was 
that targets were divided accordingly, operations assigned, 
and each element allowed to· carry out its own standard 
operation, regardless of merit or utility. 
With such a nebulous strategy, or lack of strategy, the 
American military tradition of obtainable goals was in 
danger. The answer came in the form of production; 
quantifying the quantifiable. "Thus the three air forces 
achieved great efficiencies in generating the highest 
possible number of daily bombing sorties; the Artillery 
worked hard to fire as many shells as possible; the Infantry 
and Air Cavalry tried to obtain the most "contracts" to 
score the highest body counts in assaults, patrols, and 
sweeps; and all the other forces and service units did ~heir 
best to produce the most, each in its own way according to 
its own measure. 118 
More than anything else, the body count exemplifies 
America's invol vernent in Vietnam. In a war with no front 
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lines and few visable means of determining success or 
failure, the number of enemy killed served as a convenient 
substitute. The result was body counts became an end in 
th ems elves; passes were granted to soldiers for killing the 
enemy, senior officers inflated figures to enhance their own 
prestige, and a whole new system for dealing with this new 
form of "taking the high ground" was devised. 9 The reported 
totals of enemy casualties were subsequently vastly 
exaggerated. As one observer noted, "I know one unit that 
lost 18 men in an ambush and reported 131 enemy body count. 
I was on the ground at the tail end of the battle and I saw 
five enemy bodies. I doubt if there were any rnore. 1110 
By 1968, the American effort in Vietnam ran amok. At 
the end of that year, 536,000 troops were on hand. This 
number was a source of criticism from all quarters, but the 
true number of U.S. combatants was even more interesting. 
Fewer than 80,000 men served in infantry battalians. Even 
when allowing generously for the rest of the units directly 
facing the enemy, the "teeth to tail" ratio of combatants to 
support personnel was exceedingly small. As Luttwak puts 
it, "the country gave its men to be soldiers, but the system 
turned them into clerks and valets, mechanics and 
storekeepers, in huge and disproportionate numbers. 1111 
The institutional nature of the different services not 
only forced a high degree of competition, but of self 
indulgence. While only four generals were killed in Vietnam 
from 1961 to 1972, half of the hundreds of generals that 
12 served there were decorated for bravery. 
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In 1968, over 
14, 000 servicemen lost their lives in 
over 400,000 decorations were handed 
Southeast Asia and 
13 out. In 1970, 
although the U.S. presence was decidedly smaller and the 
number of dead fell below 4,000, the number of decorations 
soared to 522,300. 14 
The lon9est war in American history ended in 197 5· as 
the last Americans left South Vietnam, which was overrun by 
North Vietnamese armored divisions and conquered in a 
lightning offensive. Off Cambodia, the U.S. ship Mayaguez 
and its crew were captured by enemy forces. Caught com-
pletely off guard and unprepared, naval and air forces were 
rushed to the area. The situation was unclear, and various 
reports placed the American prisoners on the Mayaguez, in 
Cambodia and on a small island off the Cambodian coast. 
President Ford, unsure of the actual position of the 
American crew and well aware of anti war sentiment in the 
United States, hesitated to take swift action. When he did, 
it was disasterous. A contingent of Marines was landed on 
Ko Tang Island, where they met defenses in depth and took 
heavy casualties. Tne Mayaguez was boarded and found 
abandoned. A helicopter, carrying Marine replacements, 
crashed after loosing power with total loss of life. Sev-
eral others were shot down on Ko Tang Island. 
The American crew was finally located aboard a boat 
bound for the mainland, and they were rescued. The Marine 
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force on Ko Tang Island, very nearly driven into the sea by 
counter attack earlier, was withdrawn late in the day. 
Forty one American servicemen lost their lives, a pyrrhic 
' . . f 15 victory in saving arty. 
The Mayaquez incident was indeed Vietnam in a nutshell. 
The lack of planning for the possibility of having a ship 
captured, even though the same thing happened to the Pueblo 
off North Korea in 1968, left the military leadership in the 
blind. The response was predictable and clumsy. We 
coordinated tremendous firepower and numerical superiority, 
but failed to use them effectively. The entire operation 
was directed from Washington. In fact, President Ford at 
one point talked directly to Navy fighter pilots as they 
flew above the battle area. 16 
The same command structure which failed in Vietnam 
remains the backbone of the A..merican military system. It's 
inherent faults would be the cause of military disaster in 
the desert of Iran in 1980 as a highly trained, top secret 
American force attempted to rescue the American foreign 
service workers taken hostages by radical students. Once 
again, the lessons of war went unheeded. The strike force 
was composed of Delta Force, an ~rmy unit specifically 
designed for such an event, Air Force personnel for 
transportation, and a number of support troops. The number 
of !?eople taken was pared to the absolute minimum for 
secrecy and mobility, but with all services wanting 
representation, Air Force helicopters and pilots, trained in 
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long, terrain following flights and equipped for the 
environment, were deleted in favor of the Navy. As Colonel 
Charlie Beckwith, commander of Delta Force, waited 
impatiently for the overdue helicopters, he saw the 
operation slipping away. In the end, several never made it 
because of sand storms and mechanical failure, and the raid 
had to be aborted. The final act came when Marine pilots, 
apparently afraid their Air Force tankers might take off 
without them, attempted to leave. 
which eight died. 
A collision ensued in 
Not only did the raid suffer from poor coordination, the 
chain of command stretched from Col Beckwith to General 
David Jones, the Cnairrnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A 
communications link gave him control over the raid from the 
National Military Command Center in the Pentagon. The 
command system was a model of complexity. An Army colonel 
commanded the ground force, a Naval officer commanded the 
helicopters (his· never reached the sight), and an Air Force 
commander was present, as well as one for the landin9 zone. 
Between Desert One and the Pentagon was a middle level 
command set up in Egypt with an Army major general and his 
Air Force aid. 
The Iran raid was doomed by over control, over 
complexity, and lack of common training between all elements 
of the strike force. British, French, and Israeli commando 
experts were astonished by the lack of unification in the 
American force; specialists in small numbers might be 
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attached to units, but the sharing of responsibilities in 
such an undertaking did more than anything the enemy could 
have done to end any chance of success. 
Despite the military failures and embarrassments of the 
past decade, the institutional problems remain. Three 
events in 1983 serve to illustrate the deep structural 
defects in the military: the terrorist bombing of Marine 
headquarters in Beirut on October 23, Operation "Urgent 
Fury"(the invasion of Grena.da on October 25), and the Navy 
bombing strike in Lebanon on December 9. 
A commission, headed by Admiral Robert L. J. Lang, was 
convened by the Secretary of Defense, to explain the loss of 
241 Marines in Beirut. The commission was highly critical 
of the commanders involved. It sharply criticized the lack 
of elementary security measures, for concentrating 350 
servicemen in a single building, and unmilitarx instructions 
to the forces guarding the headquarters (they were ordered 
to keep their weapons unloac;Ied). Even more important, the 
commission found the chain of command "did not initiate 
actions to ensure the security of the USMNF [the Marines] in 
light of the deteriorating political/military situation in 
Lebanon. The Commission found a lack of effective command 
. . .. 17 supervJ.sJ.on. 
Responsibility for the battalion in Lebanon was 
hopelessly diluted: orders came down from USCINCEUR, the 
unified headquarters for U.S. forces in Europe, to 
CINCUSNAVEUR, the headquarters for U.S. naval forces in 
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Europe, to COMSIXTHFLT, the fleet headquarters in charge of 
Navy and Marine activities in the Mediterranean, to CTF 61, 
the amphibious task force to which the Marines were 
attached, to the commander of the Marine amphibious unit, to 
the bat ta lion 18 commander. The commission reported that 
even after the October 23 bombing, security precautions were 
inadequate as the layered staffs moved requests through too 
slowly. Only after :members of the commission visited the 
area were steps taken to improve security. 
The invasion of Grenada began early on the morning of 
October 25, 1983, and succeeded. It should have, because a 
full Marine amphibious unit consisting of 1250 men and two 
Ranger battalions assaulted the island, and were supported 
by fighter bombers from a U.S. aircraft carrier and Air 
Force gunships. Tneir opposition was composed of less than 
700 Cubans and a handful of Grenadans. 
Of the 700 or so Cubans on Grenada, no more than 43 
were professional soldiers, including 22 ff . 19 o 1cers. 
Grenada was also unprotected by any sort of an air defense 
system, nor were there any tanks or artillery pieces 
available. Nevertheless, the initial invasion forces 
required reinforcements on the second day of the operation 
as General John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff announced, "we got a lot more resistance than we 
20 expected." Elements of the 8 2nd Airborne Di vision were 
ordered into the area, and more followed on the third day. 
The primary reason for Operation Urgent Fury, at least 
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publically, was the danger faced by hundreds of American 
medical students attending school in Grenada. A 24 hour 
shoot on sight curfew was imposed by Bernard Coard' s new 
government, and the spectre of another Iran hostage system 
loomed large in the mind of President Reagan. Other key 
goals were political prisoners at the Richmond Hill prison 
and the residence of Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon, the 
Queen's representative and the only real alternative to the 
Coard regime. 
Instead of swift, decisive action, the operation 
degenerated into a series of fire fights and mistakes. The 
students at St. Georges Medical College were almost 
forgotten and in fact called the A..merican forces for help. 
The Cuban forces on the island might well have captured or 
killed them at will. The force sent to take Richmond Hill 
prison failed in its objective and was rescued by Marines 
after taking casualties. A team of Navy SEALS (their own 
elite troops), met armored cars enroute to the Governor-
Generals house, and had only small arms to oppose them. 
Surrounded at Scoon's house, all but one was wounded. They 
were unable to call for help immediately, because Navy and 
Army radio equipment were incompatible; the SEALS eventually 
used the residence telephone to call in supp?rt.
21 
By the time the island was secured, 18 American 
servicemen died and 116 were wounded. Several helicopters 
were shot down and more were damaged. Accidents claimed the 
lives of several soldiers as a Navy boat overt11rned and two 
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Army helicopters collided, and 21 Grenadans died in a 
b . 'd 22 born ing acci ent. 
In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, military 
leaders presented the outcome as a great triumph. The 
numerous problems were excused by poor intelligence and 
determined resistence of Cuban "professionals," both of 
which were shallow rationalizations. On the positive side, 
American troops, especially the Rangers, showed great 
courage and innovativeness. But in the end, the same 
problems from the past plagued the operation and caused 
unnecessary loss of life. 
First, although Urgent Fury was a land battle, the 
operation was planned and commanded by the Navy because 
Grenada lay within the boundaries of the Atlantic Command in 
Norfolk, Virginia. Even though there ws an Army deputy, 
there was no single commander for the ground forces. 
Apparently, the Navy and Army could not reach an agreement 
on. the matter. So while there was no naval battle to speak 
of, the Navy ran the show. 
The fact that the Navy planned the operation was very 
evident in the nature of the invasion. As Edward Lut twak 
explains, the natural Army tendency would have been to 
conduct a "coup de main," in which _ bodies of troops large 
enbugh to suppress any resistance are simultaneously placed 
on the target proper; there is no need for tactical movement 
as objectives are taken at 23 once. The Navy course of 
action, easily understood from a historical perspective, is 
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a bridgehead invasion plan. In much the same way American 
forces took Pacific islands, forces invaded, established 
bases, and moved inland. The inherent problem with this, 
especially on a smal 1 island, is that the enemy can use 
interior lines to regroup and establish resistance. It was 
inevitable that we met opposition continually as we advance 
inland. 
The bureaucratic struggle also manifested itself in the 
forces used, specifically the Navy SEALS. Trained to 
infiltrate in twos and threes to gather intelligence, these 
Navy commandos were improperly employed as a strike team. 
Their normal armament, light automatic weapons, was 
overmatched by Soviet built armored cars and they were 
forced to fight in the open. 
In the end, all the objectives of Operation Urgent Fury 
were met, but it is an understatement to say we were lucky. 
A 645 page Senate report on America's defense sighting 
serious shortages of vital supplies and poor Army-Navy 
coordination, stated "in a more serious fight against a 
stronger and more sophisticated enemy, these organizational 
failures could prove disasterous. " 24 But the failure would 
continue. 
In punitive strikes against targets in the Chouf and 
Metn mountains east of Beirut on December 4, 1983, the Navy 
lost 2 aircraft out of a strike force of 28. 25 This would 
not normally be considered a high number, but closer 
examination reveals poor planning and lack of preparation by 
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the Navy. The Israeli Air Force shot down 88 aircraft and 
deestroyed a large number of missile sights without the loss 
of a single plane in an environment much more dangerous than 
that faced by the 26 Navy. In fact, the Israelis had 
prevented any full scale development of an anti-aircraft 
missile defense in Lebanon. The Navy faced only small guns 
and heat seeking missiles, both of which could be defeated 
with minor countermeasures, but were not. 
Heat seeking missiles can be thwarted by simple flares 
and hot balloons. Even though these are used by the Air 
Force and several foreign countries, the Navy did not have 
any. Planners refused to buy them in favor of more ships 
and aircraft, for institutional growth. Small arms fire can 
be easily defeated by either attacking at night (Navy planes 
are equipped with night-vision equipment), low level attack, 
or a surprise attack with hidden routing to the target. The 
planning officers on the carrier task force knew this, but 
were not allowed to plan out the airstrike. In a committee 
setting, the Joint Chiefs in Washington negotiated with the 
unified command headquarters in Europe, the Navy 
headquarters in Europe, and the Sixth Fleet (strangely 
reminicent of the Beirut tragedy). The result, had it not 
involved the loss of lives and aircraft, was almost comic. 
The attacl<: was launched at 8:00 A.M. with good visibility 
for gunners; the aircraft gathered at 20,000 feet over the 
task force ensuring early detection; and the attack was made 
from 3,000 feet, ideally within tr1e range of small heat 
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seeking missiles. No competent officer would have 
prescribed such an attack, but as Rear Admiral Roger Box, 
commander of the aircraft carrier battle group stated, 
orders for the air strike were "dictated by a higher chain 
of command than the Navy. 1127 He added, "the sun was 
highlighting our aircraft while the missile sights were in 
the shadows, and we lost two aircraft. 1128 
~1easured against this list of failures and half vie-
tories, there have been limited successes. In 1981, Navy 
interceptors shot down two Libyan fighter aircraft in the 
Gulf of Sidra with relative ease. Four years later, in an 
at tempt to demonstrate that "you may run, but you can't 
hide," an airliner carrying terrorists who hijacked an ocean 
liner and killed an American citizen was tracked, 
intercepted, and forced to land in Italy by four Navy F-
14's. Most recently, and most daring, was a raid on Libya 
in retaliation for a Berlin disco bombing. A large strike 
force of Air Force aircraft from England flew a 2800 mile 
route to avoid European airspace and timed their attack to 
coincide with Navy planes from two carrier battle groups. 
While the effects of the attack are still being assessed, it 
was an impressive display of mobility, timing, and will. 
Critics of defense reform sight these military actions 
as proof that the system works, but with the exception of 
the most recent raid, forces from only one service were 
involved. There in lies the main problem. As separate 
organizations, the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force have 
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developed extensive doctrine and tactics suitable to 
prosecuting a war which they may fight. But there will be 
no war that will involve only one branch, they must all 
fight together. And while the unified command system 
espouses this, in reality the very organization and rules by 
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff operate make it virtually 
impossible. Not only is this a recognized fact now, but has 
been for some time. 
Just one year after the formation of the JCS, it was 
reevaluated by the Hoover Commission. Four major criticisms 
were raised: ( 1) the alloofness on the JCS from the other 
parts of the national security organization; (2) their 
excessive concern with Service particularization and 
aggrandizement; (3) their inability, because of obligations 
within their Service Chief roles, to devote sufficient time 
to joint matters; and (4) an excessive burden of minor 
matters. The report was issued in 1948, and although reorg-
anization steps were taken in 1953 and 1958, no substantive 
29 progress has resulted. 
Nor has there been any lack of criticism from 
authoritative sources. In 195 3, General of the Army Oma:c 
Bradley complained of "--compromise rather than integrated 
policy; --too great a focus on short run and superficial 
rather than long-range fundamental issues. 1130 In 1982, 
General David C. Jones surrunized "we need to spend more time 
on our warfighting capabilities and less on intramural 
squabbles for resources. 1131 As Alice Norris, a civilian 
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intelligence analyst, puts it, there are three 
characteristics of the JCS which provide a starting point 
for change and at the same time mark the binding limits for 
evolution: one, it is a committee system; two, it is a 
coordinating system; and three, it is an advisory, not a 
decision making, system. These characteristics have been 
incorporated into the JCS by legislation over the past four 
decades. 32 
There are no easy solutions to the problem of military 
reform. 'llhether or not a form of JCS reorganization does 
succeed, and a more centralized, coherent establishment is 
realized, will depend on a number of factors. Is there a 
sense of urgency within the defense organization sufficient 
to overcome ~raditional practices and bureaucratic inertia? 
Does Congress fully understand the needs of the military, 
and can it force reform? Is there even a need for major 
overhauls iri. the system, or will evolutionary change remedy 
the perceived problems? 
The most .. comprehensive work on defense reorganization 
is found in The Pentagon and the Art of War, by Edward 
Luttwak. In it, he describes the numerous failures of the 
military establishment and the reasons for them. He also 
suggests a variety of reforms, including the establishment 
of a general staff system. Alice Norris, working with the 
National SEcurity Council and the Air Force, examined the 
role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and possible reforms in 
1984 with her paper "A General Staff for the United States?" 
19 
As a philosopher once noted, there are no simple 
answers, only logical al terna ti ves. Therefore, to fully 
grasp the complexities of the defense establishment, its 
problems, and possible cures, a short history of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff will lay the foundation for possible reform, 
and will be followed by criticisms of the JCS. An 
alternative, the formation of 
presented by defining what a 
several general staffs from 
discussing their relative 
a general staff, will be 
general staff is, reviewing 
the past and present, and 
strengths and weaknesses. 
Combining both discussions, a discussion on how a general 
staff could improve the American military establishment and 
allow the Pentagon to serve in the strategic role for which 
it was intended wil 1 be made. Going beyond the works of 
Luttwak and Norris, restructering the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and service chains of corrunand to fully utilize a general 
staff is presented. Finally, the prospects for a general 
light of opposition to real 
and the historical American 
staff will be addressed. In 
change within the military 
mistrust of a centralized military control, the likelihood 
of such reform must be critically assessed. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
Al though the Joint Chiefs of Staff has, as an ins-
titution, served for over 40 years, there have been few 
substantive changes to it. This is not to say there has 
been no attempt to alter or restructure the JCS; dozens of 
proposals have been submitted to modernize and make it more 
efficient. 
Until World War II the United States was reluctant to 
establish any form of a unified command system for its 
national defense. Insulated by the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans, isolationist in nature, and traditionally suspicious 
of the military, the U.S. was content with the 19th century 
makeup of its land and naval forces. There was little 
impetus to develop an organization to plan and direct the 
armed forces and opposition to centralize military control. 
The U.S. entry into World War II was the direct reason 
for the creation of the JCS. The limited cooperation 
between the Army and Navy brought about by the Joint Army-
Navy Board was inadequate for wartime operations. The 
rapidly developing relationship between the U.S. and Great 
Britain was enhanced by the Arcadia Conference in late 1941 
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which established the Combined Chiefs of Staff for direc-
1 ting the Anglo-American effort. While the British were 
well prepared for staff operations (with one of their own 
for some 20 years), the Americans were not. 
The original JCS was probably the most efficient one 
ever and certainly contained the most famous military 
leaders. T'.ne staff was made up of Army Chief of Staff 
General George Marshall; Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-
Chief, US Fleet; and General Henry "Hap" Arnold, Commanding 
General of the Army Air Forces. 2 Later, the position of 
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief was created and 
filled by Admiral William Leahy, and he became the senior 
member of the staff. 3 T'nese officers served for the 
remainder of the war and directed the largest armed force i.n 
the history of the United States. 
Even with the newly formed organization, the Army and 
Navy chose not to cooperate fully. There were, for all 
purposes, two separate wars, with the Army directing the war 
against Germany and the Navy against Japan. The Air Force, 
still a part of the Army, was not invited to debate the 
issue. This system worked well enough during the war due to 
the vast resources commanded by both the Army and Navy and 
the geographic nature of the war, but problems emerged in 
the post-war period. 
The legislative basis for the existence of the JCS was 
the National Security Act of 1947. T'ne Army, planning for a 
general staff since before the war, naturally intended to 
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dominate the structure. At the same time, the Navy sought 
to thwart any attempts to redefine the traditional naval 
role and was highly critical of the Army's plans during 
Congressional hearings. 
continues today. 
This antipipathy to unification 
The actual makeup and evolution of the JCS was not the 
product of carefully weighed lessons of warfare, but a 
compromise based on political forces of the time. In a 
sense, it reflected the government in that it retained a 
system of checks and balances intended to maintain control 
of the military establishment. 
The National Security Act established the Air Force as 
a separate and equal entity to the Army and Navy; a National 
Military Establishment (later the Department of Defense); a· 
Secretary of Defense with general control over the service 
departments; the National Security Council; and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. 4 
The .Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprised of the chiefs of 
staff of the respective services, were· designated "principal 
military advisers to the President and the Secretary of 
Defense. 115 The major functions of the 







review major materiel and personnel requirements of the 
armed forces; (3) to formulate policies for joint training 
and education of members of the military forces; and (4) to 
establish unified commands in strategic 6 areas. While 
impressive in scope, the role of the JCS was never as strong 
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following 1947. 
The newly formed position of Secretary of Defense and 
the new National Security Council, both with direct access 
to the President, quickly gained prominence. Their expand-
ing roles in the national defense came at the expense of the 
JCS. This, along with the requirement for the JCS to act 
like a committee, drastically reduced the capacity of the 
staff to influence military matters. 
The next two years saw two slight changes to the JCS. 
In 1948, the Key He st Agreement gave the staff 
responsibility foi providing strategic direction to the 
armed forces as well as general direction to all combat 
operations. It also called for the formation of unified 
7 commands. The position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff was created in 1949. Austensibly to provide 
control of the service chiefs, the chairman had no command 
authority over the JCS or military services. His 
responsibilities included setting up the aganda and 
presiding over JCS meetings, and advising the Secreta~y of 
Defense on matters where no collective aggreement could be 
reached. 
The next reorganization step came in 1953. In a step 
intended to widen civilian control of the military, the JCS 
were removed from corporate command responsibilities. Also, 
military departments, not individiual JCS members, were 
placed as heads of the unified and specified commands. THe 
responsibilities of the chairman were expanded to include 
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managing the work of the staff and approving appointments of 
staff officers. 8 The decade of the fifties saw tremendous 
advances in military technology, particularly nuclear 
weaponry. With technology came soaring defense costs and 
violent arguments concerning resource allocation. The 
complexities of both technology and economics compelled 
President Eisenhower to propose a true unified command 
structure. Advancing his call for the system, Eisenhower 
said, "separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone 
forever ... Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity 
must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning 
must be completely unified, combat forces organized into 
unified command, each equipped with the most efficient 
weapons systems that science can develop,· singly led and 
prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. 9 With that 
statement, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was 
initiated. 
After 1958, all operating forces, with very few 
exceptions, were assigned to unified or speciJied commands. 
The line of authority e.stablished by the Defense 
.Reorganization Act extended from the President to the 
Secretary of Defense to the operational commands. Orders 
were issued through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The staff 
was directed to "assist" the Secretary of Defense in 
directing the unified and specified con~ands, and the size 
of the Joint Staff was doubled to 400, the same it is today. 
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The function has changed little as well. The basic 
planning role of the JCS is related to operational command 
responsibilities by the 1958 directive from the Secretary of 
Defense: "To prepare strategic plans and provide for the 
strategic direction of the armed forces, including the 
direction of operations conducted by commanders of unified 
and specified commands and the discharge of any other 
functions of command for such commands directed by the 
10 Secretary of Defense." 
Following the Vietnam War, more moves were made to 
streamline the JCS organization. By 1978, the Secretary of 
Defense had taken the Defense Communications Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency 
out of the JCS chain of command and into his own. One 
additional agency, the Command, Control and Communications 
(C3) System Directorate was established and placed under ,JCS 
control to oversee the development of command and control 
systems and attempt to develop inter-operability among 
11
. 11 a ies. 
The evolution of the JCS from World War II through the 
major changes of 1958 and beyond has been a process of 
compromise. The newest changes will be discussed later. 
Numerous problems in system, from the structure to authority 
and responsibility, abound, and criticism of the staff is 
frequent. There have been, in fact, far more studies of the 
JCS than successful attempts to reform it. 
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CHAPTER III 
CRITICISM OF THE JCS 
While there has been a lack of real reform in the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff organization, there has been a plethora of 
criticism, beginning shortly after its inception. The Army 
and Air Force have long favored a more centralized staff as 
a better organization, while the Navy and Marines oppose any 
additional centralization of military authority, and in fact 
would prefer less centralization than in the present form. 
This competition in ideology is likely to endure. 
Writing in the International Security Review, Leonard 
W'ainstein points out three characteristics of the JCS which 
both are the baseline for its evolution and the limits 
within which it may evolve: first and foremost, it is a 
committee system; within that committee system it is also a 
coordinating system; and three, it is an advisory, not a 
decision-making system. 1 The present makeup of the JCS is a 
product of legislative acts in 1947, 1949, 1953, and 1958, 
and it will take another act of Congress to effectively 
reform it in the future. 
It has been said that a camel is a horse designed by 
committee. Not only is this an apt description of the type 
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of organization the JCS is, but it also gives insight into 
the complexities of the Pentagon. The JCS is composed of 
service members, supported by the Joint Staff, which reaches 
decision by compromise. Formal position papers submitted by 
the JCS to the Department of State, Department of Defense 
and National Security Council are accepted with a very large 
grain of salt and generally held in low regard. 2 At even 
the lowest levels of importance, a staff summary might 
transit seven or eight offices, a more pressing matter could 
pass through dozens. Recorrunendations in such papers have 
thus been reviewed by so many agencies that they reflect 
the absolute lowest common denominator of agreement. 
A critical report on the shortcomings of the ,JCS was 
highlighted by the comments of former Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown who said that the advice of the JCS was "worse 
than nothing." Further, "Robert Komer, once the No. 3 man 
in the Pentagon, calls it a laughing stock, and former JCS 
Chairman Maxwell Taylor argues that it should be abolished. 
The reason: the JCS decision..~aking process is ponderous and 
flawed, elevating parochial concerns above the national 
interest and possible disaster in war. 113 
In similar fashion, in the aftermath of President 
Carter's public pledge to defend the Persian Gulf against 
attack the JCS met to discuss how this might be carried out. 
Komer relates, "What do the Chiefs do during this entire 
period? They spend a lot of time ar9uing about command 
arrangements, more than they do thinking of strategy." As a 
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result the basic document for U.S. strategy for defending 
Persian Gulf oil--a mission essential to the survival of the 
industrial democracies--was written in the Spring of 1980 by 
Komer, a civilian. The JCS Chairman, David Jones, would 
attend meetings of the National Security Council to discuss 
strategy, Komer recalls, "but he would not express the JCS 
position because . . . ..4 there is no JCS position. Dean Acheson 
was once quoted as saying that the result of interservice 
rivalries on the JCS and its inadequate staff is that the 
system produces oracular utterances instead of real military 
d . 5 a vice. 
This is not to say that coordination is without 
strengths; it does allow for the maintainance of a great 
deal of corporate knowledge and expertise. Yet the 
weaknesses seem to override the benefits. In one incident 
during the Kennedy administration, the JCS were unanimous in 
their advice that the U.S. should not commit itself to a 
ground war in Asia (a wise position following what amounted 
to a lecture discussing the futility of ground warfare in 
Asia by General Douglas MacArthur). However, each Chief had 
a different idea on what exactly should be done. President 
Kennedy, seeking a definite course of action, turned to his 
Secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara, for strategic 
advice. There was, and is, no legal requirement for the. 
advice of the JCS to be followed, and the situation was 
exacerbated by a growing reluctance on McNamara's part to 
seek or accept military advice. The result was a major 
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growth and increase in influence of the Department of 
Defense, and a concurrent decline in the influence of the 
r: 
military. 0 The lasting impression has been the erosion of 
the JCS; decisions from the level of of expenditures to 
structure of forces are made by civilians outside the 
military. During the Dominican Republic crisis that began 
on April 25, 1965, President Johnson met almost continuously 
in the White House with his closest personal advisors and 
the Secretaries of State and Defense, but with the 
conspicuous absence of General -·wheeler, the Chairman of the 
JCS, who was not invited until April 29 after numerous 
7 important demands had already been made. 
A special working group from the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies at Georgetown University reported 
to Congress in March, 1985 that "The JCS remains incapable 
of providing meaningful advice on issues involving important 
service interests or prerogatives ... in short, none of the 
three components of the joint military establishment is able 
to perform its role effectively. 118 Headed by Edward C. 
Meyer, and with an impressive list of participants including 
Samuel Huntington, David Jones, and Edward Luttwak, the 
group adamantly supports the overhaul of an organization 
which "continues to act as a executeive secretariat ·to 
coordinate service views rather than as an independent, 
unified military staff. 119 
If there is a single focal point for the committee 
system, it is the relationship between the individual 
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services to the JCS. The service chiefs of the Army, Navy, 
Marines, and Air Force must not only advocate the interests 
of their respective branches but also try to cut through 
parochial squabbles to prepare the national defense. In the 
best of times, this balancing act is extremely difficult; 
normally it is imposs~ble. More often than not, loyalty to 
the service is an overriding consideration. It has been 
hinted in closed circles that the use of F-llls in the Libya 
raid was not so much a tactical decision as it was an 
economic one: the Air Force wanted to demonstrate the 
utility of it's aircraft for the upcoming budget battle 
between the services. Such emphasis on service . priori ties 
is a definite obstacle toward centralization and true unity 
of operations, and the problem extends throughout the ranks. 
As a junior officer in the Pentagon, leaning too far in 
the direction of the other services is considered definitely 
unhealthy for his or her career. ·while such problems as 
duplication of effort and economy of force might lead one 
to support the allocation of resources in favor of the Army 
or Navy, the Officer Effectiveness Report (OER), the source 
document which decides promotions and assignments, is 
written and controlled within one's own service. There is 
no "balancing act" to worry about; with feverish competition 
for funds, leaders place a high premium on allegience. Risk 
taking and realistic planning, two vital ingredients in the 
preparation of the military for war, take a back seat to the 
day by day worries of managing a career. 
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general staff has its roots deep in 
first recorded staff being that of 
The thrust behind creating a general 
staff is to cultivate a group of highly professional, deeply 
motivated officers who would serve as the backbone for 
planning and executing warfare. The· screening process 
starts early to remove promising young prospects from their 
existing chain of command and indoctrinate them to staff 
life. Once appointed, they would form an elite cadre, one 
with continuity and corporate knowledge, to guide the 
nations military. 
One of the key points of the general staff is that it 
is an ent;.ity in its own; a general staff officer might be 
reassigned to an operational unit at any given time, yet he 
would always be a member of the staff, and thus his 
allegiance remains at that level. This practice allows a 
staff officer to avoid the scrutiny of local commanders, 
ensuring he carries out his prime duty of executing the 
directives of the general staff. 
Three general staffs, one from the past and two from 
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the present, serve as examples of functional military 
establishments. Each has its own peculiarities, yet all 
focus on the overriding principles of centralized military 
control and the effective prosecution of warfare. The 
British General Staff, while limited in scope, illustrates 
the evolution of a staff system in a democracy. The Soviet 
General Staff is the best example of a current centralized 
military system, and it owes many of its practices to the 
most well known of all military systems, the German General 
Staff. 
The formulation of the British Defense Staff is in-
dicative of western democracies; during times of imminent 
danger or outright warfare, the scope and importance of the 
staff grew. Extended periods of peace brought a stagnation 
of military thought and less efforts toward staffing. The 
British did attempt to learn from their mistakes, as 
witnessed by events after the Crimean and Boer Wars. The 
serious problems encountered during the Crimean War led to 
the establishment of the Council of Military Education under 
the Duke of Cambridge, the commander-in-chief. 2 The most 
important impact of this action was the establishment of a 
college to train staff officers, yet little actual work was 
accomplished toward developing effective staffs. After the 
lengthy Boer War, a second study was ordered which concluded 
that British staff organization had not kept pace with world 
military evolution. A general staff was commissioned, and 
grew into the Committee of Imperial Defense in 1907, with 
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the responsibility of reviewing the military needs of the 
British Empire. 3 The foundations of a war office which, for 
the most part, lasts to today were laid. 
In 1924, the Cniefs of Staff Committee was formed as an 
agency of the Committee of Imperial Defense. It served as 
the point of contact with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
during World War I I. The Minister of Defense position was 
created in 1936, and strengthened appreciably in 1947 as the 
individual Service Ministers lost their cabinet posts. The 
Department of Defense evolved in 1948, and the Chairman of 
the Chiefs of Staff in 1955. 4 
The centralization of the British armed forces has come 
in a period of declining overseas responsibilities and more 
reliance on deterrence. As a result, the size of the 
British military has declined and allowed more centralized 
control. In the Falkland Islands War, there was a high 
degree of unity of command and interservice cooperation, a 
necessity in successful prosecution of a conflict such a 
great.distance from home bases. 
In speaking of the Soviet General Staff, John Erickson 
relates, "At the heart of <Soviet Military> 
professionalization lies the General Staff, the apotheosis 
of professionalism and the institutionalization of expertise 
par excellence, at once an institution and a professional 
elite in its own right, a planning agency, and a command 
instrument which has ... assumed managerial functions". 5 
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The Soviet General Staff is a true general staff, the 
best example of one today. It is charged with the 
fundamental planning for the Soviet Armed Forces and decides 
how each service will be employed in a conflict. Staff 
officers are drawn from the individual services, but ties 
are severed once an officer is marked, and from then on pro-
motions are determined by the General Staff. 
Not only do the Soviets maintain a vigorous staff 
system, they place high emphasis on military education 
throughout an officer's career. There are some 170 military 
schools, academies, and institutions, headed by the General 
Staff Academy which dictates doctrine and training 
objectives for all other military educational institutions. 6 
A key element of importance is that the Soviet General 
Staff, responsible to the Ministry of National Defense, 
maintains command authority over individual services. The 
scope of general staff functions is vast; a comparable list 
in the United States is accomplished by the Department of 
Defense, the JCS, the National Security Council, and even 
parts of individual services. The Soviet General Staff is 
also charged with analyzing the ·changing aspects of warfare 
and political and military ramifications, developing theory, 
and transforming theory into practice. 
The Soviet General Staff is all-encompasing, an in-
strument to coordinate the military effort from theory to 
application, from training to prosecution. It is designed 
to take the most pror:nis ing military minds in the nation, 
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educate them, train them, and utilize them within the 
framework of the Communist Party to manage one of the most 
powerful military systems in history. It is a commonly held 
philosophy that the Soviets prepare to fight the same type 
of combat they encountered in World War II, only on a far 
wider scale. This is perhaps an apt statement, as they 
observed and copied many ideas from their enemy at that 
time, Germany. 
The need for a strong mi ii tary is prevalent theme in 
German history. Located in central Europe with poorly 
defensible frontiers, invasion -has long since necessitated 
the formulation of a capable military and popular support 
for military expenditures. Indeed, the excel lent German 
staff system was paramount in numerous military successes. 
The year 1821 was the turning point in the authority 
held by the staff; until then the Prussian General Staff 
reported to the war ministry. This was changed by a royal 
act which appointed a single staff chief and placed the 
staff directly below· the king. This was enhanced by the 
powerful influence of General Moltke. During the wars of 
unification he employed superior staff organization to win 
an impressive set of victories, demonstrating the need for a 
strong staff in modern warfare. 7 
During World War I, General Staff officers held major 
posts and had tremendous influence; in many cases far 
exceeding their rank. In many situations, General Staff 
off ice rs held discretionary authority over superior 
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8 officers, and exercised this right earnestly. Such was the 
respect and fear of the German General Staff, its continued 
existence was forbade under the Treaty of Versilles. 9 Staff 
organizations were allowed at di vision level, however, and 
were promptly used by the Reichswher in their traditional 
form. Most of the General Staff officers of the German high 
command in World War II served on the General Staff in 
World War I. 
It was during World War II that the German General 
Staff gained both admiration and fear in American eyes. 
Despite an oveD.vhelming inferiority in numbers of men and 
equipment, German field armies continually outmaneuvered and 
outfought the Allies on both the western and eastern front. 
In several instances, only days after suffering bloody 
setbacks to Russian forces, the Germans unleashed brilliant 
counter-attacks, driving them back and inflicting horrendous 
casualties. In the opinion of many historians, had Hitler 
taken the strategic advice of the General Staff and fore.ea a 
climactic battle for Moscow instead of attempting to capture 
Stalingrad, Germany may well have defeated the Soviet Union. 
The German General Staff was a "socialized," rather than 
bureaucratic, organization, centered on three charac-
teristics. 10 The first was careful selection and education 
of officers7 so careful in fact that only about one percent 
11 of those who applied for general staff duty were accepted. 
Even at the height of World War I I, there were less than 
1000 general staff officers. 12 
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A second characteristic was that once an officer was 
accepted by the general staff, 
officer for the rest of his 
he remained a general staff 
career. Promotions, oppor-
tunities, and assignments were controlled by the general 
staff, not field units. 
The third major characteristic of the German General 
Staff was the atmosphere of innovativenes it fostered. 
Original thinking and risk taking were encouraged; comp-
lacency and dogma frovmed upon. In exercises, officers were 
often presented with situations in which the only effective 





staff history, Von 
eccentrics because he 
came up with excellent ideas. 
Moltke actively 
felt they often 
The three General Staffs; the British, Soviet, and 
German, were formed on .the basis of historical experience 
and military necessity. The respective powers of each have 
grown and ebbed with war and peace, but the central theme 
they share is continuous: centralized military control. 
This concept allows the development of theory; the 
organization, training, and equipping of combat forces; and 
prosecution of warfare. And while the American historical 
experience has been remarkably different from all three, the 
general principles of warfare are universal. The need to 
develop an organization capable of harnessing the American 
military potential to its fullest is present and growing 
with the developing complexities of armed conflict. 
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CHAP'rER V 
THE AMERICAN GENERAL STAFF: 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
The United States once maintained a vigorous general 
staff. In the chaos surrounding the War of 1812, Congress 
moved to create a general staff made up of autononomous 
bureau chiefs, such as the quartermaster general, who re-
ported directly to the Secretary of War. 1 While doing 
little to alleviate the tremendous problems American forces 
faced during the war, two postwar Secretaries of \var, 
William H. Crawford and especially John c. Calhoun, 
acknowledged the necessity of maintaining a peacetime staff 
' ' 2 organization. 
During the war, no single officer commanded the entire 
army; the War Department divided the army into districts and 
departments with individual commanders who acted on their 
own with little coordination save that which could be 
arranged through tne Secretary of war's office. In 1821, 
when Congress reduced the nation's high command to one major 
general and two brigadiers, Calhoun seized the opportunity, 
ordered Major General Jacob Brown to Washington and desig-
nated him the commanding general of the army. For a short 
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time, &merica truly had centralized military control. And 
while the semblance of a General Staff persisted, it was not 
as developed or refined as those in Europe. 
Between 1813 and 1903, the United States military 
experienced a roller coaster history. Unprepared for the 
Mexican-A.Llerican War in 1848, the Civil War in 1861, and 
Spanish-American War in 1898, armies were formed hurriedly, 
employed in battle with varying stages of effectiveness, and 
disbanded once hostilities ended. 
The exceedingly poor performance of the army in the 
Spanish-American War caught the public's attention and 
stimulated a reform led by the Secretary of War, Elihu Root. 
Upon taking office, he expressed the key concept of 
professionalism: "the real object of having an army is to 
provide for war. 113 He understood that until the War 
Department had a "single brain", as a British writer 
characterized the general staff, planning for war would be 
plagued by poor coordination, parochialism, and inertia. 4 
Careful to avoid· the brute force of sever~l high-ranking 
army opponents, Root nourished his ideas through the 
establishment of the Army War College in 1900. He assigned 
faculty duties similar to those in a general staff and 
encouraged its officers to develop and advocate the general 
staff concept. He then gathered support from a number of 
influential government and military leaders and persuaded 
Congress to accept an Americanized version of the German 
General Staff. 
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Once established, the General Staff was successful in 
bringing about several improvements. Among them were better 
officer education, field maneuvers, contingency planning, 
intelligence collection and analysis, tactical organization, 
and theoretical mobilization planning. 5 On paper and in 
practice, competence in the American military was on the 
rise. However, the lack of visable threats and traditional 
public antipathy towards the. military caused it to lag 
behind those of Europe as World War I approached. While 
American involvement greatly improved managerial expertise 
within the army, the end of the war disrupted development in 
two distinct ways. 
First, as is traditionally American, the armistice 
brought a call to "bring the boys home." The United States 
military, which swelled to millions during the conflict, 
quickly withered. Second, a new sense of isolationism 
abounded. Vowing never again to fight the European's war, 
A.rnerica settled down· behind the distances of the Atlantic 
and Pacific. We had, after all, made the world "safe for 
democracy." 
An offshoot of our distrust of the Europeans was an 
outright fear of militarism, particularly German militarism. 
American history glorifies the role of the citizen-solidier: 
.the Minuteman at Lexington and the militia at Cowpens ensure 
us that when the time comes we can pick up arms and defeat 
even the most properly trained standing army. Americans 
came to understand that German militarism itself caused the 
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war; with the inescapable corallary that if there is no 
centralized military control there will be less likelihood 
of conflict. That attitude, with short intermissions, 
prevails today. 
Establishment of an American General Staff to overcome 
the problems with the present system is not a novel idea. 
The Senate Armed Services corrunittee reported in October 1985 
the "log-rolling" and watered-down compromises are 
inevitable when individual services control promotions and 
assignments of officers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or 
other multi-service roles. 6 In The Pentagon and the Art of 
War, Edward Luttwak states, "to select the best military 
officers, - to liberate them from the one-service prisons 
which they must now operate and to let them get on with the 
job of running the show, while carefully initiating more 
detailed reform is the only remedy that can really work." 7 
Simply put, the purpose of an kmerican General Staff 
would be to bring out the best of the A..merican officer 
corps; to provide the most effective medium through which 
military leaders, both current and future, would execute 
what Samuel Huntington describes as "the management of 
violence." 
To create such an organization, significant reforms must 
be accomplished and changes made, many which go far beyond 
the Pentagon. The basic military system of the United 
States fosters the "intramural squabbles" which General 
David Jones found so distasteful, despite the emphasis 
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placed on unified command structures. 
An 
cation. 
excellent example is professional 
To foster intellectual growth 
military edu-
and corporate 
expertise, each service has a military school system which 
members either attend or take in correspondence at various 
stages of their career. Air Force officers, for example, go 
through Squadron Officer School (SOS) as a lieutenant or 
captain, Air Command and Staff College (}\CSC) as a major, 
and the Air War College (AWC) as a lieutenant colonel or 
colonel. The Army and Navy have similar programs. While 
each school devotes part of its carriculum to joint 
operations, the vast majority of instruction is service-
oriented, expecially at SOS. The knowledge required about 
the Army, Navy and Marines deals mainly with an overview of 
force structure and mission. 
A small number of officers are allowed to attend another 
services' school, and there are in fact schools for all 
services, such as the Armed Forces Command and Staff 
College, but requesting enrollment at such an institution is 
not seen as a "good career move." A common joke is that, 
given an order, an officer must consider all aspects of it's 
utility, particularly how the order will enhance his career. 
Wnile a bit exaggerated, such humor illustrates a basic 
fault with our present system. 
The military officer corps during peacetime is an 
uncomfortable beast. Promotion is based on what is 
quantifiable: job performance, effectiveness reports, 
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military education, advanced civilian degrees, and 
additional duties. Competition is keen; it is not enough 
just to do your best, you must do it that much better than 
the next man. Most of all, you must accomplish those items 
deemed as prerequisites for moving up the corporate ladder, 
the "square fillers," to succeed. 
While on joint duty, . regardless of the chain of com-
mand, an officer's allegiance remains with his parent 
service, where the power of promotion is maintained. 
Disagreement with the position of your own service, 
particularly if it involves the allocation of resources, is 
unwise for an ambitious young officer. Brought up under 
such circumstances, off ice rs adopt this practice as 
acceptable and become part of the promotion machine. 
The very sight where joint doctrine is most important, 
the Pentagon, is where the need to change the promotion 
system (for a small number of officers, at least) is most 
important. The Joint Chiefs of Staff protect their own 
interests pecause they have been trained for over 30 years 
to do so. In many ways it is not so much a conscious 
decision on their part to fight over weapons systems as it 
is a way of life; "the way we've done it in the past." 
The creation of an American General Staff would there-
fore involve a significant decision to remove a number of 
promising officers from each branch of the armed forces and 
make them general staff officers. It is but one of several 
changes which would help build a true unified command 
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structure, and it's effect would not be felt for- some time, 
but it is the cornerstone of a truly workable military 
establishment. 
Built on the German model, only a limited number of 
officers would be accepted as recruits for such a staff. 
Robert L. Goldich, a defense specialist for the Con-
gressional Research Service, notes that in 1927 only 270 
German lieutenants and captains passed a screening program 
to even take the admission test for general staff training; 
37 were selected, and only 13 remained at the end of the 3 
5 
. . 8 to year training program. Based on manpower, a similar 
ratio for the American military would show about 5,000 
applicants, 600 selections, and only 240 successful tours. 
An officer would initially spend four to five years in 
his commissioned service before applying for general staff 
duty, ample time to demonstrate the potential for leadership 
and at the same time early enough in his career to allow 
flexibility. Once established as a general staf £ officer, 
he would be removed from the service promotion and reporting 
system and placed under the General Staff. 
Ironically, the services have individual programs which 
mark young officers for -higher responsibilities. The Air 
Force, for example, has ASTRA, the Air Staff Training 
Program. Captains with four years of federal service may 
apply for this one year tour at the Pentagon, and if 
selected serve in posts at the highest decision-making 
levels of the Air Force. Only a few officers are encouraged 
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to apply, and of those less than one in ten are accepted. 
And while ASTRA officers are not officially "tagged," their 
selection to the program and time spent at the Pentagon are 
duly recorded and mark them for accelerated promotion. 
The House Armed Services Committee recommended in 1984 
that the services make special efforts to send their best 
officers to the Joint Staff. Another provision enacted made 
the Secretary of Defense responsible for ensuring military 
departments gave appropriate consideration to the per-
formance of an officer as a member of the Joint 9 Staff. 
Neither recommendation has been carrried out by ·the 
services; the problem of keeping the best officers for 
purely service responsibilities bars such actions. Only a 
system which encourages crossing service boundaries will 
consistently draw the most outstanding officers available. 
Once an officer serves three to five years on the 
General Staff, he would return to the field with his 
knowledge and indoctrination. With the distinction of not 
belonging to a particular service, he would be available for 
a wide assortment of duties in which he developed his 
expertise. Devoid of "filling squares," his abilities would 
then be harnessed to promote joint operations and unified 
command. Occasional tours at higher headquarters and the 
Pentagon would continue the officer's general staff 
training. 
In time, the role of the general staff would be to 
ensure that the preparation of the national military force 
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is carried out by the most effective means. Duplication of 
effort would be reduced and thus the actual size of planning 
staffs, such as the Pentagon, would be reduce~. Information 
on force structure and recommendations on implementation 
would be made available to senior commanders on a timely 
basis with minimal parochial influence and "intramural 
squabbles." 
Two other changes, one which has already partially taken 
place, would serve to reinforce the role of the American 
General Staff and greatly increase the effectiveness of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff - the deletion of the off ice of ser-
vice secretary and elevation of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Both would be conspicuous statements 
regarding the importance of war planning and allow the JCS 
and General Staff do its job better. 
Civilian control o.f the military is mandated by the 
Constitution and never has been seriously questioned in our 
history, even during World War II. But the individual 
service secretaries are an unnecessary and often burdensome 
link in the natiorral military establishment. Their prime 
function is to promote their services position, primarily on 
acquisition questions, a job better suited to the ranking 
military officer in that service. In fact, in their efforts 
to enhance the position of their respective services, it has 
been said that they have done great damage to any hopes for 
effective joint operations. This complicated and exceed-
ingly slow chain is further exacerbated by the committee 
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role of the JCS, and while improvements have been made 
recently, more can be done yet. 
General David c. Jones, retired Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, has repeatedly called for the strengthening 
of his former position. During his tenure, if even one of 
the joint chiefs disagreed _w:_;i,,th the recommendations of the 
Chairman, he could take his argument directly to the 
Secretary of Defense or, on some subjects, even the 
P . d 10 resi ent. Jones proposed that the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs would, by law, be named the senior military officer, 
responsible to both supervising the JCS and providing advice 
to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National 
Security Council (NSC). 11 The final Congressional report of 
the Center For Strategic-and International Studies supports 
General Jones, stating "As the only member of the JCS 
without a service portfolio, the chairman is uniquely 
situated to provide independent military advice and planning 
that cuts across service boundaries. Accordingly, the 
National Security Act should be amended to make the chairman 
the principal military advisor ... the current single-service 
veto over joint positions would be abolished and 
responsibility for formulatin9 joint positions would rest 
with the chairman supported by the Joint Staff and the 
unified and specifieq commanders. 1112 A Deputy Chairman of 
the JCS would act as his deputy and in his absence. Both of 
these steps were indorsed by the President's Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Defense Management and will shortly come into 
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being. 
General Bruce Palmer, a former Army Vice Chief of 
Staff, carries the argument one step further. The Chairman 
should be made "a statutory member of the National Security 
'l . d . ,.13 Counci , not JUSt an a viser. A logical step to ensure 
the preeminance o~ _ _!:!le Chairman would be to revive the five 
star ran.k, previously held by a select few generals and 
admirals during and just after World War II. 
Restructered, the new American General Staff and ,Joint 
Chiefs of Staff would be a streamlined, much more effective 
and efficient, military establishment. A five star Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with command authority and 
direct access to the National Security Council, Secretary of 
Defense and President would be supported by a General Staff 
made up of the finest military officers from all four 
services. Committed to the General Staff for their entire 
careers, such officers would provide the most accurate and 
timely advice available. The actual size of the staff, 
small in nature, would ensure better communications and 
information flow. 
Presently, unified operations are a way for each 
service to make sure they have "a piece of the pie." Advice 
and operations are carried out at the lowest level of 
agreement, and subsequently the lowest level of success. In 
time, the proposed American General Staff and reformed Joint 
Chiefs of Staff would be the basis for a true unified 
system. This would not cure the military of all its 
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problems, certainly, but it would be a giant step in the 
direction of establishing a much more effective national 
defense. And while arguments abound against such an 
undertaking, the creation of an American General Staff is 
"the best chance remaining for creating a rational cormnand 
structure for the United States. 1114 
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CHAPTER VI 
OBJECTIONS ·ro nrn AMERICAN 
GENERAL STAFF 
Any attempt to drastically change an institution will be 
met with resistance; the Pentagon is no exception. 
Opposition to the idea of a general staff and reform of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff comes from a number of sources and in 
varying degrees of ambivalence. 
Throughout A..'ilerican history, there has been a feeling 
that informal military units could be trained to meet 
observed threats. This "militia mentality" was formed with 
the Minutemen at Concord and Lexington as they bloodied the 
British regulars, and glorified at Bunker Hill. ·rhe 
militia's greatest moment came at Cowpens when, after 
initially retreating, they overcame an aggressive British 
charge and won the day. 
Such incidents were the exception, however, as the 
militia was markedly undisciplined with a tendency to break 
ranks and run when confronted with superior forces. 
Nevertheless, the legend of the of the militia overcame 
historical fact and imbedded itself in what Russell Heigley 
terms "The American Way of War." 
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George Washington recognized the necessity of an ef-
ficient staff system, but was in perpetual battle with 
Congress to maintain even the barest dimensions of one. Six 
months after the end of the Revolutioqary War, only 600 men 
remained in the American Army. Not only did Congress oppose 
Washington's staff requests, but standing armies in peace-
time were observed to be "dangerous to the 
1 free people." 
liberties of a 
Belief in the militia was coupled in the 19th century 
with popularism, the conviction that the frontier spirit of 
American citizens made them capable of military leadership, 
regardless of formal training or education. Together, they 
provided the nation with the comforting illusion that, given 
ample warning, natural American tendencies would sally forth 
to defeat any potential enemy. 
It is small wonder that the building of a military 
academy at West Point, New York met with violent prote.sts. 
Not only did the public resist the need for a trained mil-
itary cadre, outright fear of a European-style system 
pervaded a nation more concerned with expanding it's western 
frontier. The Civil War confirmed the antagonist's fears: 
West Point provided the majority of military leaders for the 
South and was all but blamed for starting the war by 
developing an "elitist" attitude. 
to close it down. 
Serious moves were made 
World War I added to the traditional American fear of a 
military elite for two reasons: isolationism and fear of 
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centralization. Having made the world "safe for democracy," 
American vowed never to send it's forces to Europe again. 





Roo~evelt af firrned their 
both 
never to "send our boys to fight over there." 
commitment 
With the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans on our east and west coasts, and 
friendly neighbors to the north and south, America settled 
into a pacifistic euphoria; carfully ignorant of outside 
events. The state of the nation 1 s armed forces reflected 
this mentality. 
The love affair with a nebulous American back-woods 
ability to win against all odds is best illustrated by the 
movies we as a society claim represent the true way we fight 
wars. The overly done reluctance of Gary Cooper to fight in 
"Sergeant York" typified our perceived pacifistic beliefs; 
yet at the same time the skills he learned down on the farm 
enabled him to kill a number of German soldiers single-
handedley and win ·the Medal of Honor. "The Dirty Dozen" 
related a story in which twelve A.'Uerican soldiers, all on 
death row for cornmiting one or several murders, successfully 
assaulted a German fortress prior to D-Day. German pro-
fessionalism, it seems, is no match for Yankee guile. The 
image of the American outcast is further portrayed in such 
movies as "The Devil's Brigade" and "Blacksheep Squadron," 
both of which show normal i\rnerican boys thrown into abnormal 
situations and succeeding against all odds. 
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This is not to say there is no substance for such 
portrayals; many of the movies are based on fact. Yet the 
overall impression on the American public since the be-
ginning of motion pictures is to reinforce the poorly 
understood and misconstrued notion that we need not worry, 
if worse comes to worse some force inside of us will turn us 
all into fighting men and we will save the world for 
democracy and free enterprise once again. This "John Wayne" 
mentality is a panacea, and an entirely too comfortable one 
at that. 
Abhorrence of the European militarism which initiated 
World War I confirmed America's fear of a large standing 
army; a cursory look at the war led many to believe that 
such a force was itself a cause of hostilities. Carried one 
step further, centralized control of the military was a 
dangerous and provacative step toward war. Ironically, the 
same general staff which· many sight as the basis for our 
future development was the driving force behind stopping 
efforts to build an American organization of the same kind. 
Immediately after World 'i'lar I, and especially after World 
Har II, the spectre of German militarism and its possible 
transplantation to American shores wrought heated debate in 
Congress. Concern over the idea of a general staff was 
addressed in nearly every piece of legislation on the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. In 1947, when the current JCS was created, 
the only true point of agreement about the JCS was that 
"Congress did not want a Prussian General Staff or German 
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General Staff which would, presumably, shun all efforts at 
civilian direction, gain too much influence in government 
and constantly be planning for and promoting wars. 112 A 1949 
ammendment to the 1947 Act specifically addresses this 
concern and states the legislation is to provide for the 
future security of the United States, II but not to 
establish a single Cnief of Staff over the armed forces nor 
3 an armed forces general staff ... " It may be summized then 
that Congress created a military ·establishment in its own 
image, one with a system of checks and balances aimed not so 
much at the efficient planning and prosecution of warfare 
but one which could be controlled. 
As Vincent Davis remarks, "In Congres-s and the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, there is a bureaucratic version 
of ancient divide-and-conquer tactics that strives to keep 
the military under control by keeping the services apart. 114 
But this philosophy does not stop at the civilian author-
ities, the military services themselves have mixed emotions 
when considering a general staff system. 
Each service develops its own elite, its "fair haired 
boys," and selects them for service staffs and command 
assignments. Rarely does this include the Joint Staffs (by 
regulation, general officers must have served at least one 
tour on a Joint Staff, but this is currently disregarded and 
a great number of the flag-rank selectees are given 
. ) 5 waivers . There is a perceived threat that an elite 
"fifth service" of general staff officers will dominate the 
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military establishment. The Army, Navy, and Air Force all 
fear that the loss of control over key individuals will 
degenerate their positions. 
The newest of the services, .the Air Force, still re-
tains the memory of a time when promotions and assignments 
were decided by Army generals. On more than one occasion, a 
ranking Air Force officer was demoted and sent into "exile" 
at one of several remote posts for being too exuberant in 
his work. 
The Army,. still healing from the turmoil of Vietnam, 
also retains a corporate memory of the post-Korean War era 
which witnessed the almost complete reduction of American 
ground forces in favor of airpower- and reliance on bombers. 
At one point, the only mission demanded of the Army was to 
gain and defend air bases (one it jealously guards today). 
N€vertheless, the Army and Air Force have attempted a 
number of joint programs. The Navy, however, was and is 
the driving force in the Department of Defense against 
attempts at unification. As early as the 1920s, when Gen-
eral Billy Mitchell proposed that the battleship was being 
rendered obsolete by air power, the Navy was staunchly 
opposin9 any form of centralization. In 1938, when Air 
Corps bombers brought headlines by the extraordinary 
interception of an Italian luxery liner 700 miles out to 
sea, the Navy sponsered a new War Department regulation 
restricting Air Corps planes to within 100 miles of shore. 6 
This move was designed to prevent interference with the role 
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of the Navy and allow the growth of naval aviation. 
The Navy enjoyed a great deal of autonomy during World 
Har I I, but saw its role as the 11 first line of defense 11 
degenerate after the Korean War, an episode which guides 
Navy thinking to this date. With a dwindling defense budget 
and the advent of nuclear weapons, the United States turned 
to the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, which theoretically 
allowed us· to respond to an act of aggression at a time and 
place of our choosing. The implicit threat was that we 
would launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union to prevent 
a prolonged ground war such as we had suf ferred through from 
1950 to 1953. The Navy, trying to gain a piece of the 
atomic pie, planned the construction of super carrier 
capable of carrying aircraft with nuclear weapons. In the 
budgetary battle that followed, the construction was halted 
in favor of buyin9 more B-36s for the Strategic Air Command. 
Shocked, several admirals openly rejected the decision and 
even "leaked" information to the press that the B-36 fleet 
had serious construction problems and could not carry out 
its mission. The "Revolt of the Admirals 11 was one of the 
bloodiest inter-service skirmishes on record. The effects 
are still bein~ felt. 
The Navy remembers the treatment it received and has 
repeatedly screamed foul at any and all attempts to unify 
the armed forces and centralize control. "A Joint Staff 
composed of officers whose staff duties had kept them out of 
the field for successive years would necessarily rely on 
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outdated information about service capabilities" stated the 
7 Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, Jr. He raised the 
ghost of the German General Staff during testimony before 
Congress and argued, "for all its influence-and renowned 
tactical expertise-it was unable to formulate a successful 
national strategy and brought its country to defeat. 118 
General Paul X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
warned the Armed Services Committee against creating a cadre 
consisting of the "professional bureaucrat and compromiser, 
one who is skilled in perfect syntax in the preparation of 
neuter position papers and staff reports. 119 Kelley later 
wrote that he knew only one Chairman who supported drastic 
reform, adding "and his views must be carefully weighed 
against his performance while in office. ,,HJ This is a 
biting criticism of General Jones. 
The Navy, with its traditionally high degree of 
independence, does little to promote joint operations at any 
level of operations. Its position on the subject is 
manifest in the treatment of naval officers on the Joint 
Staff. In 1982 and 1983, the Army and Air Force promoted 
from one to four officers on the Joint Staff "below the 
zone" in recognition of accelerated abilities. 'rhe Navy and 
Marine Corps did not promote a single staff officer below 
the zone. Even "within the zone" promotions for Naval 
officers on the Joint Staff lagged behind that of the naval 
staff and the fleet, sending a clear signal that the Navy 




ut mediocre ones. 
Naval leaders consistently argue that the present sys-
tern is not only adequate, but change would threaten 
carefully developed command lines. Admiral James Holloway 
II I, former Chief of Naval Operations, states: "We must be 
extraordinarily cautious in approaching any decision to make 
significant changes. T'ne present system works ... it has 
served us well in .its same configuration through two 
conflicts and years of cold war with the Soviet Union. 1112 
Possibly the greatest barrier to change in the Depart-
ment of Defense is the concept of change itself. Any highly 
institutionalized bureaucracy is resistant to change, 
particularly from outside. With change comes the prospects 
of job loss and relegation to lesser status. A visit to the 
Pentagon is less than inspiring; one is left with the 
distinct impression that a large percentage of the positions 
there could be eliminated with little detrimental effect. 
Indeed, many proposed changes call for the reduction of 
staffs throughout the nation's military headquarters. Yet 
plans have been formulated to renovate the Pentagon for more 
office space and an annex is under construction. 
The services appear to be playing a game of chicken, 
waiting for the first one to make a move in the direction of 
meaningful reform. A number of joint programs have been 
launched, such as the Army-Air Force Airland Battle Doctrine 
and the conversion of a number of B-52s to carry Harpoon 
anti-ship missiles, but the steps are tentative and there 
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continues to be a strong resistance to additional moves 
toward centralization. And while there is little dis-
agreement that the present system could be made better, the 
consensus among senior military leaders is that it is not, 
as Senator Goldwater contends, broke, and there should be no 
drastic measures taken to fix it. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
When the Air Force initially procured the F-16 and F-15 
fighters, there was considerable trouble in keeping more 
than a few of them flying at any given time. Highly 
complex, with literally thousands of intricate parts which 
had to all work at the same time to be successful, these 
planes, the most sophisticated and deadly weapons of their 
kind in the world, sat unused for weeks on end awaiting 
spare parts. \'lhen asked about the abilities of the F-16 and 
F-15, an only half joking response was that "when they work, 
boy are they beautiful." 
Much the same can be said of our entire Department of 
Defense. There have been some moments of glory over the 
P.ast decades, many that go unnoticed by modern historians: 
Westmoreland' s direction of the Battle of the Ia Drang 
Valley in 1965 that saved South Vietnam from being cut in 
two by communist forces, the Battle of Khe Sanh that 
witnessed some of the best coordination between land and air 
forces in contemporary history, the capture of Palestinian 
terrorists who seized the Achille Lauro, and the more 
recent bombing of Lybia all can make us justifiably proud. 
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Yet the mistakes of our past and the reasons for them 
cannot be dismissed, and we have made some tremendous 
blunders. Needless lives have been lost, the prestige of 
the most powerful nation on earth has ebbed, and the 
military's ability to carry out its mission is in question. 
The consequences of this are inescapable and dangerous: our 
enemies' perception of our lack of strength invites 
aggression and seriously undermines attempts at maintaining 
world stability. 
Three questions must be addressed when examining our 
defense inadequecies: one, who is at fault? two, what should 
be done? and three, can it be done? Within the framework of 
these questions the topic of defense reform and 
reorganization is discussed. 
First, who is at fault? The answer is nobody. While a 
great deal of criticism has been aimed our military leaders, 
there is no doubt but that they are acting in what they feel 
is the best interests of the United States. An interview 
with a general or an admiral, regardless of his position is 
on defense reform, would reveal a reasonable, well educated, 
professional soldier. It must be remembered that by the 
time an officer reaches the decision-making level of the 
Pentagon, he has probably spent close to 30 years in 
uniform. The indoctrination, explicit or implicit, in that 
period of time is impossible to ignore and almost as 
impossible to change. Our senior leaders act and think the 
way they do because that is how they were trained. The 
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problem, therefore, is in the system that we have created to 
control the military and prepare it for war. From the 
review of the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
presented, it should be apparent that significant changes 
have resulted only when extraordinary circumstances dictated 
them. The growth of the JCS has been an evolutionary, not a 
revolutionary, process. 
The history of an aircraft, the T-33, might character-
ize such a process. First flown in 1945, the P-80 (as it 
was called then) was outmoded as a fighter by the Korean 
War. We nonetheless kept it, and it has been used to train 
pilots in both fundamentals and air interception. As the T-
33 aged, new flight instruments were introduced which, 
although aiding the pilot, could not be fitted into the 
aircraft efficiently. They were put in anyway. Tne result 
is that we have a very old airframe, and though many of its 
components are relatively modern and beneficial, they are so 
strewn around the cockpit that the pilot has difficulty 
using them. 
The Pentagon, in the same fashion, has grown with the 
complexity of warfare. But its "airframe," too, is very old 
and in bad need of renovation. Wnile there are a number of 
very badly needed components present in the nations military 
establishment, they cannot properly be employed unless the 
body that utilizes them modernizes with them. 
Oddly, in modernizing the JCS, we seek answers from the 
past. This is a tribute in many ways to Clausewitz and the 
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dictum that certain principles of warfare are timeless, and 
that "there is only one thing that counts: final victory." 
The German General Staff, which is unfailingly referred to 
when speaking of reorganization, remains the best example of 
a highly efficient and professional national war-planning 
staff. The oft-cited fact that this general staff did not 
prevent the loss of two wars is a hollow argument against 
implementing its principles. The remarkable accomplishments 
of the German General Staff against insurmountable odds 
transcend such criticism. 
It must, be understood, however, that an American Gen-
eral Staff (with the necessary collateral changes associated 
with it) will be far more complex than its German 
predecessor. While the German General Sta£ f was concerned 
with land forces, the United States must plan for war on 
land, at sea, and in the air. Warfare in space looms as a 
possibility in the near future. Again, no matter how great 
the intricacy of the effort, historical experience dictates 
that a highly trained cadre of officers schooled in the 
practice of warfare and given the opportunity to devote a 
career at the higher levels of planning will provide the 
backbone for a truly effective national military 
establishment. This is the answer to the second question. 
While, on paper, the idea of a general staff is appeal-
in3 it can only be successful if several prerequisites are 
met. "First, only officers of the highest caliber and 
motivation should be considered for such duty. The screen-
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ing process must be able to differentiate between those who 
are capable and thase who simply want to advance their 
careers. Second, the staff must be kept small. The term 
strength in numbers is not applicable to staff work. 
Further, large number of general staff officers would tend 
to "water down" their identity and degrade their intended 
purpose. Third, and most important, once accepted on the 
general staff, an officer would remain on it for the rest of 
his career. Tying promotion and responsibility to the 
general staff 
the latitude 
is the corners tone in 9i ving 
to disagree with established 
the individual 
procedures and 
take risks in his 







atmosphere, one that does not allow for rapid innovation. 
And finally, will a general staff system be adopted by 
the United States? Histol::"ical analysis provides . a gloomy 
outlook. The American experience is vastly different from 
that of Germany, Russia., and even Great Britain. While each 
example of a general staff has parallels from which to draw 
lessons, any attempt to reorganize the Penta::7on in such a 
mannner would be a complex undertaking. And while few 
people actually understand what a general staff is, many 
seem to know enough to link it to Prussian militarism. 
There is a genuine fear of a centralized military in the 
United States, one that belies any attempt to demonstrate 
the merits of such a system. 
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The status quo is always more comfortable than an 
uncertain future. Many will point out that, with the 
exception of Vietnam, the present system has sufficiently 
defended the United States and its western allies since 
1945. But satisficing is an insufficient decision level 
from which to defend a nation; what has worked well enough 
in the past does not guarantee success in the future. 
The United States has never faced the destruction that 
England, Russia, and Germany experienced during both World 
Wars I and II. Our recent military debacles are relatively 
insignificant when compared with the battles of Britain, 
Kiev, and Stalingrad, but they have occurred during limited 
conflict. War, it is said, is its own multiplier. Transfer 
mishaps such as an army officer having to telephone from 
) 
Grenada because he did not know the Navy• s code, or Air 
Force helicopters carrying wounded being waved off a Navy 
carrier because the pilot did not have the proper 
qualifications to land, to a major conflict, and the 
pot~ntial for military disaster is real. 
Incompetence in the military comes nearer to immorality 
than in any profession; the lives of millions, the very 
existence of a nation may depend on the quality of its 
fighting forces. In a country that values freedom above all 
else this is poorly understood. Unfortunately, one of two 
things will bring this realization about. Either a 
prolonged effort by leaders in positions powerful enough to 
force the change, or a military disaster. In the first 
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case, efforts have been made to improve and increase joint 
operations by the military in such areas as the Air land 
battle, anti-ship warfare and even space. Over a period of 
time, these moves will provide the opportunity to practice 
true unified operations. This will not, however, solve the 
problems of parochial interests and inter-service 
sompeti tion. The second possibility, a military disaster, 
is a frightening thought bllt one that must be considered. 
The United States does not have an impressive history of 
progressive reforms in peacetime. 
In the end, rapid change in the Pentagon is impossible. 
Substantive change on the scale needed to bring about a 
general staff and reorganize the Joint Chiefs of Staff is 
unlikely from within, and only increased pressure from 
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